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Abstract: Private firm financing, given the far-reaching importance of non-publicly
traded companies for global output and employment, is still a relatively underexplored
area. Since the seminal work of Petersen and Rajan (1994), only a small branch of
research into private firms’ cost of debt has been established. We aggregate the full body
of this research that has empirically investigated antecedents of private firms’ cost of
debt in a meta-analysis. The foremost antecedents can be categorized into either
borrower, creditor or financial statement verification attributes. Our results reveal a set
of 11 highly significant and robust determinants.
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1. Introduction
Companies of all sizes and industries are in the perpetual pursuit of raising funds to
finance growth. However, if there are insufficient internal funds, companies must resort
to obtaining equity or debt from capital markets. In contrast to publicly listed firms with
relatively easy access to additional equity capital, small private businesses rely primarily
on debt funding, mostly in the form of bank loans (e.g., Berger and Udell 1995). While
new funding sources, such as crowdfunding, initial coin offerings and the like, have
gained some notoriety in the business press in recent years and also sparked academic
interest, their relative importance in practice is dwarfed by bank financing which remains
the “classic” SME funding source (e.g. Deno et al. 2020). Hence, research on the
determinants of private firms’ cost of bank debt is of profound interest for managers
and regulators alike. On one hand, managers have a substantial interest in reducing the
amount of interest paid on their outstanding debt. Therefore, an awareness of the most
significant determinants and how they can be influenced is crucial. On the other hand,
policymakers can act on research findings to develop regulations that improve the flow
of credit in the economy, for instance, by determining the optimal degree of disclosure
requirements and mandatory financial statement verification.
Research on the various determinants of private firms’ cost of debt began with
the seminal work of Petersen and Rajan (1994). They were the first to investigate the
effect of various firm, loan, and relationship characteristics on the magnitude of loan
interest rates. However, despite the great importance of private firms for the world
economy,1 there is comparatively little research on the pricing of their most important
source of funds. Nevertheless, even the scarce existing evidence shows mixed results on
some of the supposed drivers of firms’ cost of debt. This is not surprising given that
access to private firm data is often problematic (e.g., Cassar 2011; Lisowsky and Minnis
2018). Thus, we encounter papers with widely varying sample sizes and a wide range of
countries under investigation. As a result, this line of research has yet to achieve
consensus on the required control variables. Hence, our meta-analytic approach closes
an important gap in the literature. Meta-analyses entail several advantages. First, one can
reasonably expect that potential errors made in individual studies cancel each other out
(Fagard, Staessen and Thijs 1996). Specifically, while individual studies might suffer from
multicollinearity and/or unobserved correlated variables, these issues should not bias
meta-analytic results. Second, they are not prone to psychological biases. On one hand,
if the number of underlying studies is great, narratively summarizing their results might
be "too taxing for the human mind" (Hunter and Schmidt 1990: 468). On the other hand,
Indicative of this, Lisowsky and Minnis (2018) estimate that in the U.S., private firms outnumber public
firms by eighteen-to-one – or three-to-one if one requires a minimum of $100 million in revenues.
Globally, small- and medium-sized (SME) private firms account for 95% of firms and about two-thirds of
employment (OECD, 2000).
1
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narrative literature reviews might also be skewed to only reflect the researcher’s desired
results (i.e., a practice that is commonly referred to as “cherry-picking”).
For small private companies seeking debt capital can be a difficult endeavor,
since they are subject to relatively few regulatory requirements with respect to the
disclosure of financial information (Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano 2007; Van
Caneghem and Van Campenout 2012). In general, for effective decision-making in
lending, banks must rely extensively on the accurate and reliable financial information
provided by loan applicants. They must do so to determine an appropriate risk premium
as part of pricing the loan. Otherwise, lenders are forced to resort to more restrictive and
relatively monitoring-intensive contract terms, such as collateral and covenants.
Cumulatively, our meta-analytic results exhibit three important sets of drivers for private
firms’ cost of debt. Specifically, borrower, creditor, and financial statement verification
attributes. Nevertheless, especially the latter part of the literature is still significantly
underexplored. Cumulatively, we reveal a set of 11 determinants of private firms’ cost of
debt which fulfill all three quality criteria of meta-analytic research. First, they appear in
at least five studies (Hay, Knechel and Wong 2006). Second, they are significantly
associated with the dependent variable over the full body of research (Stouffer et al.
1949). Third, the association is robust as the number of unpublished papers with an
insignificant association one would need to find to nullify the overall significant result is
at least twice the number of published studies underlying the meta-analysis (i.e., the socalled “file-drawer test”; Rosenthal 1979).
We contribute to the current state of knowledge on the private firms’ cost of
debt by collecting, aggregating and evaluating the results brought forward in the available
body of literature. Among other factors, there is strong evidence for significant negative
correlations between a firm’s size, interest coverage ratio, and potential collateral with
various proxies for cost of debt. Additionally, the study of prior literature on the topic
reveals that the effect of financial statement verification, with respect to the type of audit
opinion or type of audit firm, recently found its way into academic research. The reason
for this evolution can be attributed to the unique setting of private firms, in which the
informational role of auditors can be investigated, largely unbiased by the effects of other
information intermediaries (Kim, Simunic, Stein and Yi 2011) or the effects of auditor
litigation concerns. While most individual studies might suffer from rather imprecise cost
of debt estimations, attributable to the predominant form of computation that divides
interest expense by (average) total debt and most often does not take into account the
existence of (nominally) interest-free debt (e.g., accounts payable) or the maturity
structure of loans, the meta-analytic results neutralize these biases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The subsequent section
describes our systematic identification of the relevant literature as well as the underlying
general empirical framework. Section 3 explains the methods used to conduct the metaanalyses. Section 4 presents the results clustered into borrower, creditor and financial
LOY AND MOHRMANN • SME’S COST OF CAPITAL: A META-ANALYSIS • 3
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statement verification attributes as well as a range of robustness checks. The final section
concludes the paper.
2. Data and methodology

2.1.

Search strategy and data

The most common empirical approach employed in the identified publications takes the
following form (1):
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑓𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝑎2 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎𝑘 𝑔𝑖𝑘 + ∑ 𝑎𝑒 𝑔𝑖𝑒 + 𝑒𝑖

(1)

where 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑓𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 is a proxy for the cost of debt incurred by private firms.
The most prevalent measure is firms’ aggregate interest expense at year-end scaled by
average total liabilities. Other measures include bond spreads, external credit scores, or
actual loan rates acquired from firm and bank questionnaires to which some authors had
access. The independent variable 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 measures firm size. In most published research,
it is the natural logarithm of total assets. Another control variable employed in virtually
all published papers in this area is 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 , which proxies for the influence of a firm’s
indebtedness on its cost of debt. 𝑔𝑖𝑘 and 𝑔𝑖𝑒 each represent a vector of variables of
interest and additional controls, respectively. These include firm, bank, auditor or other
characteristics. We will discuss the identified variables more closely in the results section.
Finally, 𝑒𝑖 denotes the error term.
We initiated the process of identifying the relevant literature as inputs for our
meta-analyses with a keyword search of the most prevalent scientific search engines (i.e.,
EBSCO Host, JSTOR and Google Scholar). Especially Google Scholar enables us to
also identify working papers published in pre-print repositories. In the first step, our
keywords consisted of “cost of debt”, “debt pricing”, “loan pricing”, as well as “private
firms” and “SME”. We applied Boolean operators to narrow the search results down to
papers at the intersection of cost of debt and private firm research. Second, we manually
checked whether the papers actually followed a multivariate regression approach, such
as the general model presented in equation (1). Additionally, we screened the detected
literature for further cues to other relevant studies. Our final sample consists of 41
papers, which comprise a total of 44 analyses. The papers were published during the
period from 1994 to 2018 and are based on samples from 15 individual countries as well
as one paper which looks into a large cross-section of European countries (Fülbier and
Gassen 2015). For each identified paper, we focus on the main results (i.e., the main
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table). If a paper only reports results for subsamples, based on different data sets, each
set of results is treated as a separate analysis.2 Table 1 lists all identified papers.
- Insert Table 1 about here It became apparent that the topic of private firms’ cost of debt resulted in interest
from a range of scholarly fields, such as banking and finance, accounting,
entrepreneurship and economics. Most papers were published in Small Business
Economics (SBE, 5), the Journal of Accounting Research (JAR, 3), the Journal of
Business Finance & Accounting (JBFA, 2), the Journal of Small Business Management
(JSBM, 2), and The Accounting Review (TAR, 2) with 20 other journals following with
single contributions. Additionally, seven studies are unpublished working papers (WP).
A majority of papers investigates samples from the United States (U.S., 10), Germany
(6), Spain (6) or Finland (5).
- Insert Table 2 about here Table 2 presents the 201 independent variables employed in the 41 (44) identified
papers (analyses), respectively. For the sake of clarity, we further cluster these variables
into five main categories (i.e., borrower, creditor, financial statement verification,
macroeconomic, or governmental attributes). In the next step, we follow Hay et al.
(2006) and only consider independent variables that were employed in at least five
studies. Hence, we disregard most variables, since, for instance, 146 were just employed
once. This results in a final set of 17 variables, which we will investigate more closely.
Otherwise, the results of the meta-analyses could lack validity and generalizability due to
an insufficient number of observations in underlying studies.

2.2.

Methodology

To conduct the meta-analyses, we follow the seminal work of Stouffer et al. (1949), who
developed a method to aggregate the test-statistics of similar independent variables that
occur among a wide set of empirical studies which share similar hypotheses. In this sense,
Stouffer’s method allows for making inferences about the overall significance and
direction of the association of independent variables used in similar circumstances.
Hence, the meta-analytic results are of a higher validity and generalizability compared to
any single study’s results.

Specifically, this is the case for Elsas and Krahnen (1998) who run four separate annual analyses with
sample sizes ranging from 83 to 92.
2
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Initially, we build on Stouffer’s unweighted test, which is implemented as
follows:

𝑍𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 =

∑𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑍𝑖
√𝑘

,

(2)

where 𝑍𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 is the final Z-score value for the aggregated test-statistics of the
individual variable under consideration. ∑ 𝑍𝑖 is the sum of Z-scores that are based on
the transformed p-values of each test included in the final sample that employs the
respective independent variable.3 The sign for each 𝑍𝑖 is derived from the reported
coefficient in the underlying individual analysis. k is the number of tests (i.e., analyses)
included in the sum. To derive the aggregate level of significance, the respective value of
𝑍𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 must be transformed into its corresponding p-value. We consider the variable
to have a significant association if the p-value is less than 5 %. Finally, the overall
direction of the effect is derived from the sign of 𝑍𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 .4 The original version of
Stouffer’s test considers each result as having equal importance and validity, regardless
of the individual studies’ sample sizes. In our case, these vary widely, ranging from 83 in
one of the partial analyses performed in Elsas and Krahnen (1998) to 442,026 in Fülbier
and Gassen (2015). Hence, we present the main results using the weighted version of
Stouffer’s test:
𝑍𝑊 =

∑𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 𝑍𝑖
2
√∑𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖

(3)

where ∑ 𝑍𝑖 once more resembles the sum of Z-scores that are based on the transformed
p-values of each test included in the final sample but is weighted by the proportion of
observations in the respective study compared to the total number of observations in all
included studies. Again, the respective value of 𝑍𝑊 is transformed into its corresponding
p-value.
While meta-analyses have the advantage of being less prone to the errors made
in individual studies (Fagard et al. 1996) and are not subject to psychological biases, such
as “cherry-picking” (e.g., Hunter and Schmidt 1990), they suffer from their own potential
shortcomings. By definition, they can only aggregate the results of published studies.
However, there might be studies that are expected to exist but have never made their
To determine the aggregate effect size of repeatedly used independent variables, their correspondingly
reported t-statistics are transformed into p-values. Those, in turn, are transformed into z-scores.
4 The final z-scores were capped to a maximum/minimum of +/- 4.892 for each analysis to reduce the
effect of outliers, as some studies report t-statistics of much larger values.
3

LOY AND MOHRMANN • SME’S COST OF CAPITAL: A META-ANALYSIS • 6

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 24, No. 2, Winter 2022 • pp. 01-37
way into a journal or other forms of publication. Studies that report insignificant results
generally run the risk of not being published or released, a phenomenon that is
commonly referred to as the “file-drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979: 638). It is
conjectured that studies that report type one errors find their way much easier into
scientific journals, as they are more likely to be received as novel and relevant to the
reader (Hay et al. 2006; Hunter and Schmidt 1990). This might create a perception of
reality that is not in in line with the actual body of knowledge. To test for the possibility
of a whole array of unpublished studies, the Fail-Safe-N test (Rosenthal 1979) was
developed. This test estimates the number of studies with insignificant results that would
be required to nullify the overall significance of a certain independent variable in a metaanalysis. In line with most other meta-analyses, we accept a Fail-Safe-N of twice the
original number of published studies which use the variable in question. The Fail-SafeN test takes the following mathematical form:

𝑋=(

2

∑ 𝑍𝑖
1.645

(4)

) −𝑘

where X is the number of unpublished studies with insignificant results that is required
to make the aggregated (significant) results of a meta-analysis ultimately insignificant on
a significance level of (greater) than 5 %. ∑ 𝑍𝑖 is the sum of Z-scores that are related to
one specific independent variable from the studies included in the meta-analysis and k,
once again, represents the number of analyses included.
3. Results
Table 3 presents meta-analytic results for the set of 17 independent variables that have
occurred in at least five of the previously identified papers. Each result will be discussed
in detail in terms of the underlying intuitions of what direction of causality can be
reasonably expected, the actual result of the meta-analysis, and an attempt to explain
unexpected or mixed results.
- Insert Table 3 about here For the sake of clarity, the control variables are categorized into borrower,
creditor and financial statement verification attributes.

3.1.

Borrower Attributes

Firm fundamentals There are three variables, which we consider to be firm
fundamentals, that are widely represented in the private firm’s cost of debt research,
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namely, firm size, the potential for collateral, and firm age. The most prevalent
independent variable in the literature is firm size. In most cases, it is proxied by a firm’s
total assets or total sales. Usually, the measure is then transformed into its natural
logarithm to enhance the linear relationship with the explanatory variable. When
investigating the effect of firm size on cost of debt, an overwhelming majority of authors
expect a negative correlation as larger firms are usually more diversified and asset-backed
(e.g., Vander Bauwhede, De Meyere and Van Cauwenberge 2015). In addition, larger
firms are predominantly more mature and have already proven that they can run a
sustainable business model and have established a better information environment (e.g.,
Badertscher, Givoly, Katz and Lee 2015). Nevertheless, they also commonly face greater
agency conflicts, attributable to an increasing separation of management and ownership,
which results in greater monitoring needs (e.g., Minnis 2011). Finally, larger firms are
characterized by less concentrated lending (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994), whereas its
effect is unclear a priori. Our results underpin these predictions and show a significantly
negative correlation between firm size and the associated cost of debt (p = 0.00001). Of
the 36 analyses included, 24 report significantly negative associations, whereas only two
report significantly positive associations. Conclusive evidence for the overall negative
effect comes from the file-drawer test, which estimates a total number of 2,848
unpublished studies with insignificant results to be required to nullify the overall metaanalytic findings. If we separately consider studies which measure firm size by total assets
or total sales, we arrive at the same conclusion. Overall, firm size turns out to be a highly
critical variable in the determination of the level of the cost of debt of private firms.
Similar results manifest for potentially available collateral. The meta-analytic results
of the 18 included studies are in line with the common notion that firms with a larger
proportion of tangible assets are considered less risky (e.g., Guedhami and Pittman
2008). The available collateral has a significantly negative association with the cost of
debt (p = 0.00031). Of the 18 studies, 12 (3) report a significantly negative (positive)
correlation with cost of debt, respectively. Our result is highly robust with a file-drawer
test value of 327.
Similar to the rationale behind firm size, firm age proxies for maturity. As firms
mature, they usually also grow. Moreover, their stakeholders generate increasingly
profound private knowledge about the business model and associated risks. Moreover,
mature firms are expected to have more long-standing and trust-based relationships with
banks, which may further contribute to a decline in the cost of debt (Van Caneghem and
Van Campenhout 2012; Karjalainen 2011; Niskanen and Niskanen 2010). However, this
might also result in a hold-up situation, which could ultimately increase interest rates.
Indicative of these contradictory lines of argument, only five of the 16 relevant studies
report a significantly negative correlation, while three show significantly positive
associations. While the largest proportion of studies reports insignificant results, the
meta-analysis of all studies concludes a significantly negative association (p = 0.00008)
LOY AND MOHRMANN • SME’S COST OF CAPITAL: A META-ANALYSIS • 8
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with a moderate Fail-Safe-N of 38. This result is partially attributable to the fact that the
larger studies (i.e., the ones that carry more weight in our main results) report negative
signs.

Leverage and distress Firms that report high leverage (i.e., high debt to assets ratios) are
expected to operate on comparatively more “shaky feet” with a higher risk of insolvency.
Anecdotally, banks consider this in their loan pricing decisions and charge higher interest
rates. Our meta-analytic results, however, cannot confirm this rationale. With a weighted
Stouffer p-value of 0.00001, we follow the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958).
They conject that a firm can increase its value extensively when it mostly relies on debt
capital funding, which is attributable to the tax-deductible nature of interest expenses.
Only when the amount of debt financing becomes relatively too large will the increased
risk of insolvency make an incremental increase in debt financing unfavorable. Of the
31 studies identified, ten support the initial assumption. Nine, however, report
significantly negative associations. The majority of studies (12) report insignificant
results. Another explanation for the mixed results in the literature might be that firms
that are offered loans with small interest rates are prone to obtain excessive amounts of
debt. Therefore, high leverage often coincides with relatively small interest expenses
(Vander Bauwhede et al., 2015).
A considerable amount of empirical analyses also controls for the impact of clear
over-indebtedness, as proxied by a negative book value of equity. Intuition suggests that
negative equity capital will make any financial relationship a particularly risky undertaking
for banks and thus will induce them to charge a considerable risk premium on their loans.
Seven out of nine studies that control for this attribute report significantly positive
results. The meta-analysis supports this overwhelming finding with a significantly
positive association (p = 0.00001) and a Fail-Safe-N of 132.

Repayment ability The ability to generate sufficient cash flows is essential for a firm to
service its debt. It is therefore expected that firms that show an increasing inflow of cash
will be offered lower interest rates (e.g., Guedhami and Pittman 2008). Six studies control
for this variable. Two (one) studies show significantly positive (negative) results. The
remainder report insignificant results. Our meta-analysis also reveals mixed results with
no overall significant association (p = 0.27133). An interpretation of this result may be
that banks prefer information other than cash flow figures. Moreover, covenants and
bank monitoring might favor tying into financial accounting data. As such, the results
could also be attributable to a lack of sufficient observations, since in most jurisdictions’
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), cash flow is only a voluntary, pro
forma figure.5
Another measure associated with repayment ability is liquidity. More favorable
liquidity ratios are associated with improved credit scores and are thus expected to be
rewarded by banks with lower interest rates (e.g., Dedman and Kausar 2012; Lennox and
Pittman 2011). The aggregate result of 13 studies reports a negative and highly significant
association (p = 0.00001). In addition, the majority of studies (eight) show a negative
correlation, whereas three (two) report positive (insignificant) results. Moreover, 207
additional, previously unpublished studies would be required to invalidate the metaanalytic result. The single liquidity measures (i.e., current and quick ratios), corroborate
the initial result with highly significant negative associations.
Another meaningful figure to determine a firm’s debt servicing potential is the
interest coverage ratio. The higher the ratio of earnings to overall interest expenses, the
greater is a firm’s ability to repay its creditors. Unsurprisingly, it is also one of the most
widespread performance-based covenants (Chava and Roberts 2008). Our meta-analytic
result confirms that rationale with a significantly negative association (p = 0.00001). Of
the 19 included studies, 12 show a significantly negative correlation, while only four
document significantly positive associations. The high Fail-Safe-N of 389 suggests that
this result is very robust.
In their seminal study, Petersen and Rajan (1994) already control for the effect
of sales growth on cost of debt, as this represents investment opportunities and gives an
indication of a firm’s future profitability. Hence, growth should be associated with lower
risk as well as interest rates, except in the case of fast-growing start-ups that might be
considered high risk, with the result of higher interest rates. Unsurprisingly, five of the
16 studies present significantly positive results, and another five studies document
significantly negative results. Overall, the weighted Stouffer test results in a significantly
negative association (p = 0.02622), whereas this result does not seem to be particularly
robust to additional unpublished studies. As such, the overall contribution of sales
growth to cost of debt remains an open question.

Profitability Regarding profitability, especially the influence of the return on assets (ROA)

ratio, this has been thoroughly investigated in the literature. Our meta-analysis can
significantly confirm the intuition that an increase in profits and, therefore, decrease in
default risk will ultimately result in decreasing the cost of debt (p = 0.00001). Out of 15
identified analyses, five report a significantly negative correlation, while only two studies
show a significantly positive correlation. The number of unpublished studies with no

In contrast, US-GAAP and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) require (publicly
listed) firms to disclose separate cash flow statements.
5
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significant results would be 82. This result is also confirmed by a separate analysis based
on the rather limited number of studies which employ a return on sales (ROS) figure.6

Form of ownership and liability A total of 13 studies also controls for the impact of

the form of ownership or the liability status on a firm’s cost of debt capital. Although 11
studies show no significant results, the overall analysis yields the conclusion of a
significantly negative association (p-value = 0.03495). On the surface, this seems illogical.
Limited liability limits the creditors’ ability to access firm owners’ personal wealth.
However, wealthy owners of corporations are commonly still personally responsible
through contractual agreements, thus, the “limited liability gain is fictional in actuality”
(Cassar 2004: 268). Nevertheless, research has developed some explanations. First,
limited liability corporations can (theoretically) have an unlimited number of
shareholders, which increases the need for better financial reporting quality (Dixon,
Gates, Kapur, Seabury and Talley 2006). Second, corporations exhibit higher levels of
income smoothing and conservatism, which protects creditors from excessive dividend
payouts by firm owners (Bigus, Georgiou and Schorn 2015). Third, the legal obligation
to publicly disclose financial statements, which is the case for European limited liability
corporations, regardless of stock market listing, results in improved access to bank capital
(Deno, Loy and Homburg 2020).

3.2.

Creditor attributes

Relationship attributes A long-standing relationship between a firm and its bank(s) is the
leading indicator of relationship lending (Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and Rajan
1994). Theoretically, the association between the duration of bank relationships and cost
of debt can go both ways. This is also reflected in the mixed results we encounter in the
literature. Two studies present a significant cost-increasing effect, whereas three studies
attribute a cost-decreasing association. The majority of studies (nine) is likewise split but
entails insignificant results. On one hand, trust between the parties is built over time, and
the lender accumulates more private information, which decreases risk and monitoring
cost. Moreover, clients with longer successful credit histories are more sought after by
competing banks (Blackwell, Noland and Winters 1998). As such, longer bank
relationships may reasonably result in a lower cost of debt. On the other hand, longstanding relationships can result in hold-up situations, in which banks can exploit their
dominant market position to charge higher interest rates. Especially in the case of
concentrated market environments, banks may acquire this position by providing
insurance for firms to supply them with affordable capital in times of financial struggle
Interestingly, the related issue of the influence of earnings management on the private firms’ cost of debt
has only been addressed in four studies.
6
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(Berger and Udell 2006; Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Stein 2014). Furthermore, banks could
benefit from the circumstance that firms are generally deterred from incurring switching
costs to an alternative bank relationship (Howorth and Moro, 2012), or the new bank
charges higher interest rates as it fears a “winner’s curse” (Garriga 2006; Ziane 2003).
However, the meta-analytic result follows the cost-increasing route with a p-value of
0.00895 and a Fail-Safe N of 11 additional unpublished studies.
Moreover, a total of seven analyses investigate the effect of the number of a firm´s
bank relationships on its cost of debt. Anecdotal evidence suggests that as the number of
bank relationships increases the more bargaining power the firm possesses over banks.
In addition, banks that are free-riding the lead lenders’ monitoring and private
information can offer lower interest rates (e.g., Carletti, Cerasi and Daltung 2007;
Diamond 1984). However, our meta-analytic result cannot support this line of argument.
We encounter a significantly positive association (p = 0.00001), while only one study
finds the predicted significantly negative result. A potential explanation for this
observation may be that the mere threat of adding bank relationships is sufficient to
incentivize the relationship lender to pass on its cost savings, which arise through
economies of scale, back to the borrower (Ziane 2003). Nevertheless, the results must
be treated with some caution, as only seven unpublished studies with insignificant results
would be required to nullify the overall result.

Contractual attributes A total of six studies include controls for contractually provided

collateral. Common wisdom suggests that collateral reduces the risk of default borne by
banks. Therefore, it seems reasonable that banks split the gains from reduced risk with
the borrower in the form of reduced interest (e.g., Bester 1985) or view collateral
pledging and (higher) interest rates as substitutes in an effort to lower credit risk (e.g.,
Lehmann et al. 2004). Nevertheless, our meta-analytic result suggests that contractually
provided collateral is significantly positively associated with the cost of debt (p =
0.00532). This result might be initially surprising, but there are potential explanations in
the literature. On one hand, there is evidence that firms in longer banking relationships
pay lower interest rates and pledge less collateral (Berger and Udell 1995).7 On the other
hand, collateral pledging seems negatively associated with older and larger firms (i.e.,
firms with longer successful track records; Harhoff and Körting 1998). Nonetheless, the
underlying diverging results we encounter in the literature (i.e., two studies find the
aforementioned significantly positive effect, while two provide evidence to the contrary)
are also reflected in a low number of studies (i.e., six) required to turn the overall result
insignificant. As data availability on collateral pledging is rather problematic, attributable

On the contrary, there is survey evidence that “housebanks” are significantly more likely to ask for
collateral (Lehmann et al., 2004).
7
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to banking confidentiality rules and collateral being considered an off-balance liability in
financial disclosures, the results are unlikely to become more robust in the near future.
An even smaller set of five studies also looks into the effects of total amounts of
specific loans on the firms’ cost of debt. As confidentiality laws also generally prohibit
banks from disclosing client relationships and their terms (i.e., including loan amounts)
and firms rarely disaggregate debt capital into specific loan components in their financial
statements, only a handful of researchers can employ proprietary archival datasets or
surveys. In theory, the association of loan amounts with firms’ cost of debt can be
complex. First, one can assume that as the loan amount increases, the relative overhead
cost of monitoring decreases, since most tasks and regulatory filing obligations are
independent of loan size. In a competitive environment, banks may pass parts of the
savings to customers resulting in lower interest expenses. However, if the loan amount
becomes excessive relative to the bank’s overall amount of loans outstanding, cluster risk
might drive up the required interest rates. Second, financially constrained firms will
borrow larger amounts from more expensive sources as long as the rate of return on the
investments financed through the debt is marginally higher (Petersen and Rajan 1994).
Third, to some extent, a firm’s size effect on total loan amounts is probable. Larger firms,
which might simply have greater nominal financing needs, are typically more diversified
and asset-backed (e.g., Vander Bauwhede et al. 2015). Therefore, both a negative as well
as positive association of loan amounts with the firms’ cost of debt is conceivable. Our
meta-analytic result suggests a highly robust and significantly negative correlation (p =
0.00001; Fail-Safe-N = 88).

3.3.

Financial statement verification attributes

While all accounting firms are legally obliged to reach a prescribed minimum audit
quality, mounting evidence in audit research suggests a profound quality differential
between the largest audit firms (i.e., the “Big 4”, “Big 5” or “Big 6”, depending on the
period under investigation) and the mid-tier and especially the smallest competitors (for
an empirical investigation in a Continental European private firm setting; cf. Loy 2013).
Research attributes this result to better knowledge accumulation (Cano-Rodriguez and
Alegria 2011), more pronounced independence (DeAngelo 1981), audit fee premiums
(Simunic 1980), increased reputational risks in the event of an audit failure (Francis and
Wilson 1988), or even pre-screening and nonacceptance of the riskiest clients (Kaplan
and Wilson 2012) by the large audit firms. In line with these findings, we assume that
private firms being audited by large audit firms incur a significantly lower cost of debt
or, in other words, higher audit fees are presumably offset by lower cost of debt. Our
meta-analytic results of nine available studies conclude that there is, indeed, a
significantly negative association (p = 0.00020). The number of required studies with

LOY AND MOHRMANN • SME’S COST OF CAPITAL: A META-ANALYSIS • 13

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 24, No. 2, Winter 2022 • pp. 01-37
insignificant results to nullify the overall result is 101. This is fairly robust as it amounts
to about twenty times the number of studies that report significantly negative results.
Nonetheless, there is also a body of research that controls for the effect of
obtaining an audit per se, as in most non-European countries, including the U.S., private
firms obtain financial statement audits on an entirely voluntary basis. In the private firm
setting, the informational role of audits can be investigated in a more isolated fashion
compared to public firm samples (Deno et al. 2020; Kim et al. 2011; Minnis 2011). The
effect of financial statement verification on the firms’ cost of debt is unbiased from the
influence of a large number of additional stakeholders and other information
intermediaries, such as financial analysts or the business press. In line with the results on
higher quality audits, we expect that firms that voluntarily choose to obtain financial
statement verification will report lower cost of debt. The meta-analytic results confirm
this notion with a significantly negative coefficient (p = 0.00001). Seven of the ten
underlying analyses also report significantly negative results. Finally, the Fail-Safe-N
amounts to a highly robust 155. An additional robustness check, with three studies that
explicitly control for the presence of voluntary audits, yields similar results. Of these
studies, two report significantly negative correlations, whereas one dissents. In the latter
case, Koren, Kosi and Valentincic (2014) anecdotally suggest that creditors of Slovenian
private firms punish firms with voluntary audits. They supposedly interpret the
underlying audit decision as an attempt to dress up the firm’s financial position.
Nevertheless, we can confirm the overall positive effect of financial statement
verification on a firm’s cost of debt.
4. Robustness checks
Some researchers explicitly do not include working papers in their meta-analyses, as they
have not yet been subject to rigorous peer-review and editorial processes (e.g., Hay et al.
2006). As the stream of literature that investigates the determinants of private firms’ cost
of debt is comparatively small – presumably for reasons that we will revisit in the next
paragraph – we decided to keep working papers in our sample. Having said that, we
repeat our analyses solely based on the 34 studies published in peer-reviewed academic
journals and can generally confirm our results (Table 4, Column 1). One exception is the
association of sales growth with cost of debt, which is rendered insignificant. However,
already the main result does not seem to be particularly robust with a Fail-Safe-N of 16.
- Insert Table 4 about here Moreover, we also exclude papers based on U.S.-samples (Table 4, Column 2).
On one hand, as private firms in the U.S. are not obliged to publicly disclose financial
statements and/or obtain financial statement audits, there are issues of self-selection
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(e.g., for a discussion, cf., Cassar 2011; Deno et al. 2020). This problem is exacerbated
by the use of proprietary datasets from rating agencies (such as in Minnis 2011), banks
(such as in Blackwell et al., 1998), or data from limited business surveys (e.g., Berger and
Udell 1995; Cassar, Ittner and Cavalluzzo 2015; Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995). Having
said that, the results remain virtually unchanged.
- Insert Table 5 about here Along similar lines, papers based on small (proprietary) datasets are
systematically underrepresented in our weighted approach. Hence, we repeat the metaanalysis with the original Stouffer method (Stouffer et al. 1949) as presented in Equation
1. Every paper now enters the overall meta-analytic result with equal weight. While most
of our results presented in Table 5 are in line with our main results, three variables
become insignificant. These are the debt to assets ratio, sales growth as well as the
duration of the firm-bank relationship. As previously discussed, without weighting by
sample size, the meta-analytic results are more susceptible to disagreement and mixed
results in the literature. Each of the aforementioned variables has about an equal number
of significantly positive and negative results in the considered papers, along with a large
number of insignificant results.
While most papers in the main analysis (Table 3) use firms’ aggregate interest
expense at year-end scaled by average total liabilities (i.e., average cost of debt), there are
some which rely on other measures which can be summed up under the umbrella of cost
of additional debt (i.e., marginal cost of debt). At a conceptual level and in practice, these
constructs are clearly distinct. For instance, a risky startup that is currently all equity
financed by angel investors is likely to have a very high marginal cost of debt but an
average cost of debt of virtually zero. On the other hand, established, well-capitalized
firms likely have both a very low average as well as marginal cost of debt.
- Insert Table 6 about here Hence, we repeat our analyses focusing on the 21 papers which build on average
cost of debt (Table 6). As the underlying analyses unanimously build on financial
accounting data, they generally have no information on contractual attributes, such as
information on collateral provided or disaggregated loan amounts. Moreover, the
number of studies which include firms’ incorporation status and cash flow information
decreases severely, as these variables are not always included in commercially available
databases. As such, for three variables (i.e., firm age, incorporation status, duration of
firm-bank relationship) the Fail-Safe-N falls below our pre-defined critical level of at
least twice the number of the original studies, attributable to a severely decreased number
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of studies. Nevertheless, the results of this robustness check are again in line with the
main results.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to conduct a series of meta-analyses on widely covered
antecedents of (small) private firms’ cost of debt. Although this line of research was
established over 25 years ago with the seminal work of Petersen and Rajan (1994), it
never reached “mainstream status”. With greater future availability of private firms’
financial statements, especially in the European Union, more research questions can and
ought to be addressed. The private firm-setting is of particular interest for a number of
reasons. First, it is less prone to principle–agent conflicts between (a large number of)
owners and entrenched management. Second, private firms’ financial statement
disclosures more closely reflect managements’ perspectives and are less likely to be
optimized and rehearsed by large legal and investor relations departments or external
consultants. Third, private firms’ financial statements are most often the only
quantitative information on the firms’ financial position and profitability and, therefore,
of utmost importance to arm’s length lenders as well as other stakeholders (Deno et al.
2020).
We identify 41 papers, with a total of 44 independent main analyses, in which a
set of 17 independent variables are employed at least five times each. These determinants
can be broadly categorized into three different areas, related to either borrower, creditor
or financial statement verification attributes. Eleven out of the 17 variables are not only
(highly) significantly associated with the private firms’ cost of debt but are also highly
robust with a Fail-Safe-N of at least twice the number of the original studies. This means
that the body of literature has to grow quite substantially with studies that exhibit
insignificant results for the overall meta-analytic result to become insignificant. Hence,
researchers interested in the study of private firms should at least try their best to
incorporate these variables as controls. Nevertheless, data availability, albeit increasing
in the European Union, is still somewhat problematic, and proprietary datasets might
not include this full set of important controls.
A limitation of our meta-analytic approach is that it cannot properly control for
country-specific particularities, with the exception of a robustness test excluding the
country with the highest number of studies (i.e., the U.S. with a total of 10 papers). Legal
and judicial infrastructures likely determine the access to credit and loan contracting in a
far-reaching manner (Berger and Udell 2006). While some studies narratively argue longstanding differences between the Continental European and Anglo-Saxon banking
systems and modes of private firm financing (e.g., Hernández-Cánovas and MartínezSolano 2010; Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout 2012), only one addresses the issue
in a cross-country setting (Fülbier and Gassen 2015). They find that the countries’ debt
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contracting infrastructures has a moderating effect on the firm-level determinants of cost
of debt. As such, investigating the topic more closely in an international setting provides
ample room for future research.
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TABLE 1
Overview of identified studies that empirically investigate private firms' cost of debt
Author(s)
Allee and Yohn
Badertscher, Givoly, Katz and Lee
Berger and Udell
Bigus, Schachner and Stein
Blackwell, Noland, and Winters
Cano Rodríguez and Sánchez Alegria
Cano Rodríguez, Sánchez Alegria and
Arenas Torres
Carmo, Moreira and Miranda
Cassar
Cassar, Ittner and Cavalluzzo
Dedman and Kausar
Elsas and Krahnen
Fülbier and Gassen
Garriga
Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca Munoz
Gray, Koh and Tong
Guedhami and Pittman
Harhoff and Körting
Hernández-Cánovas and MartínezSolano
Howorth and Moro
Huguet and Gandía
Huq, Hartwig, and Rudholm
Hyytinen and Väänänen
Hyytinen and Pajarinen
Karjalainen
Kim, Simunic, Stein, and Yi
Koren, Kosi and Valentincic
Lehmann, Neuberger and Räthke
Lennox and Pittman
Menkhoff and Suwanaporn
Minnis
Niskanen and Niskanen
Peltoniemi and Vieru

Date
2009
2015
1995
2009
1998
2012

Publication
TAR
WP
JB
WP
JAR
JMG

Country
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Germany
U.S.
Spain

Period
2003 - 2004
1987 - 2010
1988 - 1989
1993 - 2004
1998
2000 -2005

N
1,481
633
863
1,653
212
60,524

2016
2016
2011
2015
2012
1998
2015
2006
2006
2009
2006
1998

SJFA
JFRA
JAR
JAE
ABR
JBFA
JIAR
WP
WP
JBFA
JFE
JBF

Spain
Portugal
U.S.
U.S.
U.K.
Germany
Europe
Spain
Spain
Australia
U.S.
Germany

1999 - 2009
2001 - 2007
2001 - 2008
2003
2004
1994 - 1997
1998 - 2007
1993 - 2004
1996 - 2002
1992 - 2005
1996 - 2004
1998

91,431
10,283
374
1,191
4,873
353*
442,026
73,809
39,968
2,057
413
391

2010
2012
2014
2018
2004
2007
2011
2011
2014
2004
2011
2007
2011
2005
2013

SBE
SBE
SJFA
WP
WP
SJPE
IJAu
CAR
WP
SBE
TAR
AE
JAR
JSBM
JSBM

Spain
Italy
Spain
Sweden
Finland
Finland
Finland
Korea
Slovenia
Germany
U.K.
Thailand
U.S.
Finland
Finland

1999 - 2000
2004
2001 -2010
2007 - 2014
1999 - 2002
2000 - 2002
1999 - 2006
1987 - 1996
2006 - 2010
1997
2003 - 2005
1992 - 1996
2001 - 2008
1992 - 1997
1995 - 2001

182
309
15,423
11,302
78,505
11,925
10,799
9,168
5,885
334
10,782
479
14,952
1,451
279
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Petersen and Rajan
Petersen and Rajan
Schindele and Szcesnzy
Shikimi
Stein
Ughetto, Scellatio and Cowling

1994
1995
2015
2013
2015
2017

JF
QJE
JBE
IEEP
GER
SBE

U.S.
U.S.
Germany
Japan
Germany
U.K.

1987
1987
2003 - 2010
2000 - 2002
1993 - 2004
2000 - 2005

978
1,277
37,042
74,367
15,035
29,266

Vander Bauwhede, De Meyere and Van
Cauwenberge

2015

SBE

Belgium

1997 - 2010

8,908

Ziane
2003
EREF
France
2001
189
*This study includes four separate annual analyses. ABR: Accounting and Business Research; AE: Applied
Economics; CAR: Contemporary Accounting Research; EREF: European Review of Economics and Finance;
GER: German Economic Review; IEEP: International Economics and Economic Policy; IJAu: International
Journal of Auditing; JAE: Journal of Accounting and Economics; JAR: Journal of Accounting Research; JB:
Journal of Business; JBE: Journal of Business Economics; JBF: Journal of Banking & Finance; JBFA: Journal of
Business Finance & Accounting; JF: Journal of Finance; JFE: Journal of Financial Economics; JFRA: Journal
of Financial Reporting and Accounting; JIAR: Journal of International Accounting Research; JMG: Journal of
Management & Governance; JSBM: Journal of Small Business Management; QJE: Quarterly Journal of
Economics; SBE: Small Business Economics; SJFA: Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting; SJPE:
Scottish Journal of Political Economy: TAR: The Accounting Review; WP: Working Papers.
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TABLE 2
List of independent variables used in cost of debt of private firms research
(N=44)
Category

Independent Variable*

Total number
of analyses

Borrower Attributes
Firm Fundamentals

Accounts payable turnover (in days)
1
Accounts receivable turnover (in days)
1
Activity (inventory/assets)
1
Collateral available (PPE/TA)
18
Cost of debt of prior year
3
Cumulative non-operating accruals
1
Decile rank of firm's assets turnover ratio
1
Employment growth
1
Firm age
16
Firm age categories (1,2)
1
Firm assets categories
2
Firm employees categories (1,2,3)
1
Firm is above average of sample mean in terms of size
1
Firm sales categories (1,2,3)
1
Firm size (employees)
2
Firm size (market valuation)
1
Firm size (total assets)
30
Firm size (total sales)
6
Firm's credit score
4
Firm's industry average Q ratio
1
Firm's rating score applied by bank
1
Intangible assets
2
Inventory turnover (in days)
1
Knowledge intensive business model
1
Low knowledge intensive business mode
1
Marginal tax rate
1
New born firm
1
Small or medium-sized firm
1
Wage expense per employee
1
Working capital
1
Years since firms incorporation
1
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
List of independent variables used in cost of debt of private firms research (N=44)
Young firm
1
Business Risk
Absolute value of discretionary accruals
1
Altman's z-score
2
Earnings smoothness
1
Earnings volatility
1
Financial stress within the last 5 years
1
Firm's probability of default
1
High risk company
1
Low risk company
1
O-score bankruptcy probability
1
Sales volatility
1
Volatility of operating cash flows
1
Leverage

Bank debt to total assets
Debt to assets
Debt with initial maturity of more than one year
Leverage with bank debt
Negative book value of equity
Negative book value of equity with bank loans on
balance sheet
Short-term debt to total debt

1
31
1
1
9

Repayment Ability

Accrual quality
Cash flow from operations
Liquidity (current and quick ratio)
Earnings quality
Firm growth to prior year
Interest coverage ratio
Sales growth

3
6
13
1
1
19
16

Profitability

Firm loss year
1
Mean 1987 gross profits/assets ratio in two-digit SIC
industry
1
Conservatism score
1
(The table is continued on the next page.)

1
2
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
List of independent variables used in cost of debt of private firms research (N=44)
Mean gross profits/assets between 1983-87 in twodigit SIC industry
Operating income to net assets
Pretax profit margin (% of sales)
Profitability (return on assets, return on sales)
Form of Ownership
and Liability

Internal Control

At least 50 % ownership is held by one family
Average ownership stake held by owner-managers
Family owned enterprise
Firm has limited liability
Firm is government or municipality owned
Firm is owner-managed
Firm is part of a group
Firm is a partnership
Firm is an S corporation
Firm is a subsidiary of a foreign company
Foreign owner
Joint stock company
Majority of firm owners is non-white
Manager is main shareholder
Number of firm's owners
Number of legal person owners
Number of natural person owners
Number of years the current owners own the firm
Ownership stake of largest shareholder
Private equity firm owns firm
Recent change of legal form
Recent change of ownership
Second biggest ownership stake

1
1
1
15
1
1
1
13
1
3
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Firm has financial statements
1
Firm produces accrual-based financial statements
2
Legal obligation to select a certified auditor
1
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
List of independent variables used in cost of debt of private firms research (N=44)
Management
Management skill
Technological skill

1
1

Governance

Number of top managers

1

Industry

Construction
High-tech manufacturer
Hotels and restaurants
Manufacturing
Primary sector
Retail
Services
Transport

4
1
1
3
1
4
4
2

Location

East German firm
Firm in city county
Firm in fringe county
Firm is in a unit banking state
Firm is in MSA
Firm is in urban location
Firm is operating within area of hq
Region of South Tyrol or Friuli Venezia Giulia
West German firm
Number of firm's owners
Number of legal person owners
Number of natural person owners
Number of years current owners own firm

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Creditor Attributes
Relationship
Attributes

Actual overdraft at time of the survey
1
Cooperative bank
1
Duration of relationship with bank
14
Financial services used by firm
1
Firm has a savings account
1
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
List of independent variables used in cost of debt of private firms research (N=44)
Firm is subject to credit rationing
Government affiliated financial institution
Housebank
Housebank status unclear
Information symmetry
Length in years firm has worked with bank with
longest relationship
Line of credit used
Loan's fraction of a specific bank
Number of meetings per year
Multiple bank relationships (binary)
Mutual trust between bank and firm
Number of bank accounts

Number of bank relationships
Number of performing loans from subject bank
Number of unsettled debt payments
Single bank relationship
Relation with specific banks
Number of reviews per year
Savings bank
Small credit commitment
Structure of lending
Two bank relationships
Use of overdraft facilty
Contractual
Attributes

1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Amount of secured debt
3
Collateral provided
6
Debt from primary financial institution
2
Default on loan
1
Default premium
2
Discount for early payments
1
Fees and points paid for loan
1
Guarantee by nonbank financial institution
1
High risk loan
1
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
List of independent variables used in cost of debt of private firms research (N=44)
Length of relationship with current lender (in years)
Remaining time until loan maturity
Loan from a non-financial firm
Loan has a fixed rate
Loan has a floating rate
Loan is guaranteed
Loan is secured with AR/INV
Loan requires compensating balances
Loan secured other than through AR/INV
Number of bank managers involved with firm
Some debt is secured
Total amount of the loan
Uncollateralized loan amounts
Unsecured debt
Use of long-term debt (1-5 Likert scale)
Use of short-term debt (1-5 Likert scale)
Use of trade credit (1-5 Likert scale)

1
2
2
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
1

Bond Properties

Duration of bonds outstanding
Proportion of senior bonds
Bond credit rating
Outstanding years to maturity
Rate on bond issued
Senior debt
Refinance loans with bond issues

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Supplier Properties

Firm was denied trade credit
Percent of purchases based on trade credit

1
1

Miscellaneous

Loan used to replace investments
Loan has no specific use
Loan from associated company
Loan from owner

1
1
1
1

(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
List of independent variables used in cost of debt of private firms research (N=44)

Financial Statement Verification
Attributes
Auditor Quality

At least one BIG4 auditor

Audited by Big4/5/6
Audited by certified auditor (Finland)
Audit Engagement

Audit report signed by more than one auditor

1
9
3

Switch between voluntary and mandatory audit
Switch to mandatory audit
Voluntary audit of financial statements

1
10
1
1
3

Modified opinion
Qualified opinion

1
1

National

Economic development (price adjusted GDP)

1

Bank Attributes

Bank affiliation
Bank fragility
Bank size
Herfindahl-Hirshman-Index
Number of banks in firm’s area
Number of branches of non-government banks

1
1
2
3
3
1

Capital Markets

Duration spread
Interest development
Lagged inter-bank refinancing interest rate
Prime rate at the start of loan
Term premium
Bank of Italy expects tightening of credit

2
1
1
3
3
1

Financial statements have been audited

Audit Problems

Macroeconomic Attributes

Governmental Attributes
Internal Revenue Service
Monitoring probability
*Independent variables in bold font are subject to meta-analysis in this study.

1
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TABLE 3
Summary of the results from the meta-analysis for selected independent variables
N

Attributes

Independent Variables

# of significant results

Stouffer weighted
test

Pos.

Neg.

Insign.

Sign

Sig.

FailSafe-N
at p =
0.05

Borrower Attributes
Firm Fundamentals

Leverage and Distress

Repayment Ability

Profitability

Combined Size Measure

36

2

24

10

(-)

0.00001

2.848

Single Size Measure: Assets

30

1

21

8

(-)

0.00001

2.411

Single Size Measure: Sales

6

1

3

2

(-)

0.00393

12

Potential for Collateral

18

3

12

3

(-)

0.00031

327

Age

16

3

5

8

(-)

0.00008

38

Debt to Assets

31

10

9

12

(-)

0.00001

31

Negative Book Value of Equity

9

7

1

1

(+)

0.00001

132

Cashflow from Operations

6

2

1

3

(-)

0.27133

-

Combined Liquidity Measure

13

3

8

2

(-)

0.00001

207

Single Liquidity Measure: Current Ratio

10

3

6

1

(-)

0.00001

68

Single Liquidity Measure: Quick Ratio

3

0

2

1

(-)

0.00001

33

Interest Coverage Ratio

19

4

12

3

(-)

0.00001

389

Sales Growth

16

5

5

6

(-)

0.02622

16

Combined Profitability Measure

15

2

5

8

(-)

0.00001

82

Single Profitability Measure: Return on Assets

13

2

4

7

(-)

0.00001

41

Single Profitability Measure: Return on Sales

2

0

1

1

(-)
0.00403
4
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
Summary of the results from the meta-analysis for selected independent variables
Form of Ownership
and Liability
Creditor Attributes
Relationship Attributes
Contractual Attributes
Financial Statement
Verification
Audit Quality
Audit Engagement

Firm is incorporated (has limited liability)

13

0

2

11

(-)

0.03495

48

Duration of Firm-Bank Relationship
Number of Firm-Bank Relationships

14
7

2
3

3
1

9
3

(+)
(+)

0.00895
0.00001

11
7

Collateral Provided
Total Loan Amount

6
5

2
0

2
5

2
0

(+)
(-)

0.00532
0.00001

6
88

Audited by Big 4/5/6 Company

9

1

5

3

(-)

0.00020

101

1

7

2

(-)

0.00001

155

1

2

0

(-)

0.00687

5

Combined Measure: Audited Financial
10
Statements
Single Measure: Voluntary Financial Statement 3
Audit
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TABLE 4
Robustness Checks without working papers or U.S.-based studies
N (w/o WP /
w/o U.S.)
Attributes

Independent Variables

(1) w/o working
papers
Stouffer weighted
test

(2) w/o U.S.-based
papers

Sign

Sig.

Sign

Sig.

Stouffer weighted test

Borrower Attributes
Firm Fundamentals

Leverage and Distress
Repayment Ability

Combined Size Measure

31/30

(-)

0.00001

(-)

0.00001

Potential for Collateral

13/16

(-)

0.00001

(-)

0.00056

Age

13/15

(-)

0.00001

(-)

0.00009

Debt to Assets

26/22

(-)

0.00001

(-)

0.00001

Negative Book Value of Equity

7/7

(+)

0.00001

(+)

0.00001

Cashflow from Operations

5/5

(-)

0.29051

(-)

0.27133

Combined Liquidity Measure

10/11

(-)

0.00001

(-)

0.00006

Interest Coverage Ratio

15/16

(-)

0.00067

(-)

0.00001

Sales Growth

12/11

(-)

0.25848

(-)

0.02622

Profitability

Combined Profitability Measure

10/12

(-)

0.00001

(-)

0.00001

Form of Ownership and Liability

Firm is incorporated (limited liability)

13/7

(-)

0.03491

(-)

0.03495

Duration of Firm-Bank Relationship

14/9

(+)

0.00895

(+)

0.00895

Number of Firm-Bank Relationships

6/6

(+)

0.00001

(+)

0.00001

Collateral Provided

6/3

(+)

0.00532

(+)

0.00532

Total Loan Amount

5/2

(-)

0.00001

(-)

0.00001

Audited by Big 4/5/6 Company
Combined Measure: Audited Financial Statements

6/9
7/6

(-)
(-)

0.00001
0.00001

(-)
(-)

0.00020
0.00001

Creditor Attributes
Relationship Attributes
Contractual Attributes

Financial Statement Verification
Audit Quality
Audit Engagement
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TABLE 5
Robustness Check: Summary of the results from the unweighted meta-analysis for selected independent variables
N
Attributes

Independent Variables

# of significant results

Stouffer weighted
test

Pos.

Neg.

Insign.

Sign

Sig.

Fail-Safe-N at
p = 0.05

Borrower Attributes
Firm Fundamentals

Combined Size Measure
Single Size Measure: Assets
Single Size Measure: Sales

36
30
6

2
1
1

24
21
3

10
8
2

(-)
(-)
(-)

0.00001
0.00001
0.00393

2.848
2.411
12

Potential for Collateral
Age

18
16

3
3

12
5

3
8

(-)
(-)

0.00001
0.00025

327
38

Leverage and Distress

Debt to Assets
Negative Book Value of Equity

31
9

10
7

9
1

12
1

(-)
(+)

0.86029
0.00001

132

Repayment Ability

Cashflow from Operations

6

2

1

3

(-)

0.68327

-

Combined Liquidity Measure
Single Liquidity Measure: Current Ratio
Single Liquidity Measure: Quick Ratio

13
10
3

3
3
0

8
6
2

2
1
1

(-)
(-)
(-)

0.00001
0.00001
0.00001

207
68
33

Interest Coverage Ratio
Sales Growth

19
16

4
5

12
5

3
6

(-)
(-)

0.00001
0.95455

389
-

Combined Profitability Measure
Single Profitability Measure: Return on Assets
Single Profitability Measure: Return on Sales

15
13
2

2
2
0

5
4
1

8
7
1

(-)
(-)
(-)

0.00001
0.00080
0.00403

82
41
4

Firm is incorporated (has limited liability)

13

0

2

11

(-)

0.00035

48

Profitability

Form of Ownership and
Liability

(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Robustness Check: Summary of the results from the unweighted meta-analysis for selected independent variables
Creditor Attributes
Relationship Attributes

Duration of Firm-Bank Relationship
Number of Firm-Bank Relationships

14
7

2
3

3
1

9
3

(+)
(+)

0.42661
0.01991

7

Contractual Attributes

Collateral Provided
Total Loan Amount

6
5

2
0

2
5

2
0

(+)
(-)

0.01954
0.00001

6
88

Audit Quality

Audited by Big 4/5/6 Company

9

1

5

3

(-)

0.00001

101

Audit Engagement

Combined Measure: Audited Financial
Statements

10

1

7

2

(-)

0.00001

155

Financial Statement
Verification
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TABLE 6
Robustness Check with a focus on papers building on average cost of debt
N

# of significant results
Pos.
Neg.
Insign.

Stouffer weighted
test
Sign
Sig.

Fail-Safe-N at
p = 0.05

Combined Size Measure
Potential for Collateral
Age

21
15
9

1
3
3

14
10
3

6
2
3

(-)
(-)
(-)

0.00001
0.00016
0.00020

920
213
2

Leverage and Distress

Debt to Assets
Negative Book Value of Equity

15
6

6
5

9
1

0
0

(-)
(+)

0.00001
0.00001

59
80

Repayment Ability

Cashflow from Operations
Combined Liquidity Measure
Interest Coverage Ratio
Sales Growth

3
9
13
11

2
3
3
5

1
6
9
3

0
0
1
3

(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)

0.16820
0.00005
0.00001
0.01485

62
251
25

Profitability

Combined Profitability Measure

9

2

3

4

(-)

0.00001

20

Form of Ownership and
Liability

Firm is incorporated (has limited liability)

3

0

1

2

(-)

0.02149

3

Duration of Firm-Bank Relationship
Number of Firm-Bank Relationships

2
2

1
2

0
0

1
0

(+)
(+)

0.00153
0.00001

3
18

Financial Statement
Verification
Audit Quality

Audited by Big 4/5/6 Company

6

1

5

0

(-)

0.00002

120

Form of Ownership and
Liability

Firm is incorporated (has limited liability)

13

0

2

11

(-)

0.00035

48

Attributes
Borrower Attributes
Firm Fundamentals

Creditor Attributes
Relationship Attributes

Independent Variables
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